| Author | Message | ||
     Greg Hirst (Gregh) Senior Member Username: Gregh Post Number: 438 Registered: 10-2002 |
Interesting reading... http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/613twavk.asp. | ||
| Jamil Abbasy (Jamooche) Senior Member Username: Jamooche Post Number: 258 Registered: 05-2003 |
Fantastic! Another Dweb Weekly Standerd reader. Only problem is I have no time to read it with school. Jamil | ||
| Ray Gerber (Raygerber) Member Username: Raygerber Post Number: 236 Registered: 09-2002 |
Good read, and a true discussion of its finer points is probably not totally appropriate for this forum, but it does shed quite a bit of light on the politics, inside and out, of SOF in the military and their employment. I found some of his points interesting as they left out some of the finer details that really play a key role in why things are the way they are (or were if you're an optimistic type) Two quick examples: Somalia, and his characterization of the mission as "The American objective had been capturing Mohammed Aidid, a warlord who was interfering with the U.N.'s humanitarian mission..." rings true to a degree, but it ignores one of the fundamental problems with that mission-once it was turned over to the U.N., our gov't administration was so eager to 'play' the UN's game we allowed ourselves to alienate Aidid individually-without significant reason as compared to the other warlords. Was he a power player, of course, but a good explanation for why the UN choose the single most powerful figure in the Mog clan network is a look at the relationship between Bhotrus Ghali and Aidid-i.e. a longstanding blood fued between the two-thus it's fair to say the Pakistani's that were ambushed and killed prior to Blackhawk Down, and then our own forces, were unnecesarily put at risk b/c our gov't ignored the self-evident bias at play here. Just some food for thought. The second item I found striking was his discussion about infiltrating R&S and developing informants in AF and the surrounding regions. The military, and other gov't agencies, were quite hesitant to lean forward on this-for good reason, the effects of the Church committee still resonate in the HUMINT community and its going to take years to rebuild it, even with the renewed post 9/11 focus on intelligence gathering. I guess I read it with an eye for the historical context, something he caught very well when he discusses DoD mistrust for SpecOps folks. I guess as a Marine looking in on that whole conflict my perspective is a lot different then some of the other folks on here that have done time in Ranger Bn's and the like. Suffice it to say, most in the USMC lean toward the Spec Ops folks as far as preference goes... | ||
| Keith Mitchell (Keith_indy) New Member Username: Keith_indy Post Number: 31 Registered: 12-2003 |
That was a good read... You Marines have it right, and the Army should start following your example. Every Marine starts out as a rifleman. A soldier that can't or wont shoot a rifle is useless (unless they're firing ordance.) | ||
| Dan Ratcliffe (Dan_ratcliffe) Member Username: Dan_ratcliffe Post Number: 53 Registered: 07-2003 |
We had the same problem when in Beirut. We did not start to have real problems with the PLO until we became linked with the LAF (mostly Christian) when we supplied spotting teams and then direct support Naval Gunfire and Artillery. By real problems I do not mean the "small change of warfare,*" such as the odd sniper, rocket or mortar attack. I do not know if it could have been different. It does not seem possible to be stuck in the middle of what is for all intents and purposes a state-wide domestic dispute with out getting hammered. It might be good to note, that only the Italians escaped attack on 23 October. They were the only forces that were in fact neutral. I think my concern with unleashing any military force is, at least in this country, that we are not separate from the law, despite the inherent disadvantage. When we join the military we swear an oath �that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;" I believed that when I put things on the line it was in support of that oath. When I would forget that, thank goodness there was someone around, usually an officer, to remind me of that. I think we should be very careful, regardless of temptation to unleash any covert force with out being fully aware of what it might cost us nationally and individually. I have always had a little difficulty with "survival at any cost" as an appropriate justification. I think that is why I have such a problem with some of the �reality TV� that seems to require sacrificing dignity and personal character for money. My grandmother, an old Jayhawker, always told me that we Ratcliffe�s were for the underdogs; if a smaller boy was being bullied, we stepped in, but it was wrong to beat on the bully until he had started it. American�s just didn�t do things like that. I once had a very difficult time explaining to some one why we bring out our dead, often at terrible cost. I mean face it; on the surface it seems utterly ridiculous. What is to be gained? They could not understand that the ideal was one worth dying for. While in Beirut, many times while heading up in to the city, someone would point a weapon at us. It would have been considered smart in some circles to simply go at them, that�ll teach�em. I like to think we simply looked them in the eyes and refused to be daunted because we believe that courage often demands sacrifice, just like the tree of liberty does. I think that we as a nation have certain ideals that are worth risking everything for, with safety being lower on the list. I would be slow to ask anyone to become an assassin, no matter what disguise we put on it by covering it in a uniform, unless I was very sure that the gain is worth the cost to both the man and the nation. I refuse to believe that our generals are somehow so biased against using special operations that they would truly put our nation at risk. It doesn�t seem possible that these men and women to whom we trust the commands of our military forces are so limited in vision and knowledge that they are ignoring an entire part of their organization due to shear jealousy. Could the opposite be true? Could our special operations forces be so enamored of their own abilities and impact that they do not see where their usefulness ends? I do not think this is likely either. Whew! How did I get started on this? *John Keegan, The Face of Battle | ||
| Stacey R Abend (Srafj40) Member Username: Srafj40 Post Number: 156 Registered: 03-2003 |
Gentlemen, let me begin by saying that one of the mistakes that repeats (opinion), is the lack of ability for the United States to find a viable third party. Vietnam we went with the Catholic minority. Dan puts forward the LAF in Beirut and then Somalia and the UN / no Aidid. Geo political struggle, I am sure that as a nation we will continue to make mistakes. Dan, I like what you say. � I think my concern with unleashing any military force is, at least in this country, that we (United States) are not separate from the law, despite the inherent disadvantage.� If we are to be the beacon of Democracy, the rule of law must always guide the United States. Having said that I am torn. I look at the Israeli attack on the Iraq nuclear facility and the Russian�s dealing with the same issues of kidnapping in Beirut (doing their own kidnapping and castrating). These actions sent a message. I guess that we are caught in our own judicial system. A crime cannot be reported until it happens. After the crime the person is then innocent until proven guilty. Only to be given food and shelter. I am sure that as the election gets closer that there is going to be more bubbling to the surface. I think that if we abuse/use incorrectly, the policy of preemption then we are going to make the world a much more dangerous place for Americans not in uniform. Just a side note, October 3, and the actions of the Italian�s. I was not in Somalia, my friends were, and they do not have anything good to say about the Italian�s. This is because of many of their actions. Please keep in mind that much of this area was a former Italian Colony. Stacey | ||
| Dan Ratcliffe (Dan_ratcliffe) Member Username: Dan_ratcliffe Post Number: 55 Registered: 07-2003 |
Thanks Stacey, I meant October 23 1983, when we, the French, and the Israelis were attacked in Beirut. Like all issues of any weight, the answer lies somewhere in the middle. Dan | ||
| Stacey R Abend (Srafj40) Member Username: Srafj40 Post Number: 157 Registered: 03-2003 |
Dan: My apoligies, I had my Historical Ranger Tunnel Vision (HRTV) on. So the Itailian's have an interesting link from one event to the other.....If I was paranoid, I think I could make something of this. :-) (Hhahahahha) Stacey | ||
| Ray Gerber (Raygerber) Member Username: Raygerber Post Number: 239 Registered: 09-2002 |
Wow, this is starting to sound like one of my grad school classes... I think both Stacey and Dan make excellent points about the necessity to ensure the rule of law plays into how we do things-and I can see the compelling arguement that calls into question some aspects of the doctrine of preemption in general, and the employment of covert or clandestine SOF in specific. I also think its worthwhile to examine the context of the world post 9/11, and the threats we face. Its a known fact that Al-Qaida wants to pursue WMD, and its likely only a matter of time till they get some, that being said the best and most effective way of dealing with the threat is, and has been, the doctrine since 9/11 that gave us OEF, OIF, as well as numerous other smaller actions worldwide that hunts the enemy where it lives. Some of these actions come very close to the blurry line of legal and moral-like pickling off a hellfire into a car of 'suspected' terrorists in say, Yemen. JAG officers play a big part in providing guidance in these matters, but fundamentally its a commander's choice and I think we've got a very professional grounding that provides ample allowance for the constitution while keeping in mind that most that oppose us understand only the force of arms and the willingness to use it. As far as senior leadership's political misgivings about different forces to be used in situations (or not at all) I think we can all look at Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm I, the Bosnia/Kosovo campaigns, OEF and OIF and point out a lot of examples where our 'Joint' forces played a lot of politics in who was used where, but that is a long discussion indeed! Good discussion though, and if I may, Dan were you with one of the BLTs, the MAU, or some other organization while in Lebanon? I only ask since I was a member of 1st Bn, 8th Marines while in the FMF-the Bn with the unfortunate distinction of being in the barracks the day it was truck-bombed... r- Ray | ||
| Dan Ratcliffe (Dan_ratcliffe) Member Username: Dan_ratcliffe Post Number: 56 Registered: 07-2003 |
Ray. I certainly hope those sailors are learning something from you. During the PLO evacuation I was SALT Team Chief 2D Brigade Platoon, 2D ANGLICO assigned to 2e Regiment Etranger de Parachutistes. (Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment) at what was left of the French Ambassador�s residence next to the Hippodrome. After the massacres in the refugee camps Sabra and Shatila I returned and was assigned to 8th Marine Airborne Regiment ( 8eme RPIMa) and stayed until December. When the barracks was bombed, I was platoon sergeant 1st Brigade Platoon with two of my teams in Beirut. Miserably, I along with 3 teams was stuck on board the TA Castilla (formerly USS Paul Revere an old APA) assigned to elements of the Infanter�a de Marina Espanola (Spanish Naval Infantry). The remainder of my platoon, under my guide a great Marine, Sgt. Russ Harper, was assigned to the 82d ABN in Grenada. Despite some initial reports of some of my lads MIA in Beirut taken from a copy of the International Herald Tribune, we didn�t lose any one. I certainly hope no one in that battalion never thinks that some how that battalion some how deserved what they got. They were involved at the worst possible place and time to try and be peacekeepers. So much of what we know about surviving in that type of environment was learned there, hard proud lessons. I was reading the other day about the training that the lads are going through to prepare for their turn in the fire. As usual, they will do it the hard way, the most dangerous way. A young Captain told one of his Lance Corporals who when pressed by a (play acting) mob to retreat behind the sandbags, �Get back out there and face him like a man.� Dangerous, yes, sometimes we have to lose to win. I am sure that somewhere you and yours have studied Henry V, �for when lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the soonest winner.� I am again carried away, sorry. | ||
| Ray Gerber (Raygerber) Member Username: Raygerber Post Number: 241 Registered: 09-2002 |
Dan- That's right, I forgot you were ANGLICO, so you would likely be assigned to other forces to help integrate combined arms... The BN was very aware of its history in that respect, but not in a self-blame manner, it was more of a tribute to the fact that the Marines that were there came as peacekeepers and were quite naive about what they were getting into-something you've nailed down already. It was an unnecessary tragedy that illustrated a lot of problems with they way we did business (magazines out of weapons, wired into pouches to prevent 'incidents', intelligence reports being ignored for months, etc...) Since I'm stuck with the Navy I'm not 100% sure of the training regieme the boys are going through now, I do know the I MEF CG made some comments about definite change of tactics compared to the units that own the AOR right now, it seemed to me that we were going to return to the playbook taken from the old days of Vietnam (CAP and the like), and how we handled Haiti, Somalia before and after the UN screwed the pooch, etc. I'll be interested to see how it works out, as a "Young Captain" I would probably just let the Cpls and the Sgts figure out the best way to deal with the mob-it seemed to work well when I was in Haiti watching an infantry squad work a crowd of 2,000 at an HA site. I imagine that is something that is going to have to be learned by experience though. | ||
| Dan Ratcliffe (Dan_ratcliffe) Member Username: Dan_ratcliffe Post Number: 57 Registered: 07-2003 |
Gunny, put up the flag pole. SF |
